THE OWNER CONSENT STATUTES: THE DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN ENTERPRISE AND INSTRUMENTALITY
LIABILITY

Courts and legislatures have taken many different approaches to the
problem of the financially irresponsible automobile driver. Compulsory
insurance and financial responsibility laws have been much discussed.'
One chronic problem is the driver of a borrowed car. The owner may
have liability insurance, but the driver often will not. In the typical
case a friend or a member of the owner's family, perhaps a dependent
minor, causes injury by driving the vehicle negligently. Unless the injured plaintiff can get at the owner's assets or liability insurance, he
may gain nothing from litigation except an uncollectable judgment. If
it can be proved that the owner selected a driver whom he should have
known to be incompetent, he is liable under normal negligence concepts.
Agency theories and the widely recognized family car doctrine may be
helpful. 2 At least eight states have gone further and attempted to solve
the problem by adopting owner consent statutes which make the
owner of a motor vehicle liable for the damage caused by the negligence of anyone who drives it with his consent.3 The purpose of these
1 See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951); MoRRis, ToRTs 340-74
(1953); Vorys, A Short Survey of Laws Designed to Exclude the FinanciallyIrresponsible
Driver From the Highway, 15 OHIO ST. L. J. 101 (1954).
2 See 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 26.13-26.15 (1956); PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 368-69 (2d ed. 1955). Generally, the family car doctrine
makes the owner of an automobile who allows members of his household to drive it
liable for their negligence under most circumstances.
3 CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 17150-52; D.C. CODE tit. 40, § 424 (1961); IDAHO CODE tit. 49,
§§ 1403-04 (1947); IowA CODE ANN. § 321A93 (1946); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (1960);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 170.54 (1960); N.Y. VEHICLE & TRArrIC LAW § 388; R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 31-33-6 (Supp. 1962). Other states have similar statutes applying only when the
driver is a minor under sixteen or eighteen: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6106 (Supp.
1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 8, § 222 (1949); MAINE REv. STAT. ch. 22, § 156 (1954);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-2-10, 41-2-22 (1953); VA. CODE tit. 8 § 646.2 (1950). Nevada's
consent statute applies only when the driver is a member of the owner's family.
NEv. REv. STAT. § 41-440 (1961).
A closely related problem is presented by the "omnibus clauses" of some automobile
owner liability insurance policies. These clauses extend the policy coverage to anyone
driving the vehicle with the consent of the owner, and allow the injured plaintiff to
sue the insurance company directly. In Massachusetts, all automobile owners are
required by law to have liability insurance with such a clause. This amounts to a
limited owner consent statute, and presents similar problems. Dickinson v. Great Am.
Indem. Co., 296 Mass. 368, 6 N.E.2d 439 (1937). In California such clauses are also
compulsory in insurance policies, but owners do not have to have insurance. Curiously,
consent is more narrowly construed in the insurance clauses than in the owner consent
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statutes must have seemed clear when they were enacted. The owner
who lends his car to a financially irresponsible person is required
at his peril to protect the public by purchasing the necessary insurance.
If the permittee has the assets to pay a judgment, the owner is protected
by a right to recover over from him.4 One might have expected that this
sweeping statutory owner liability would make the technicalities of
agency law irrelevant in almost all automobile personal injury cases.
Ironically, however, these technicalities reappeared at once, and frolic
and detour concepts were given new life in a world for which they were
never intended.
While the owner consent statutes are a relatively specific statutory
response to a well-defined problem, the liability of a master for the torts
of his servants is a common-law doctrine which has been explained,
attacked and justified on widely differing grounds. Scholars who dislike
the doctrine have explained it as left over from medieval notions of the
power and responsibilities of the head of a family 5 or as a blind, unreasoned following of bad dicta. 6 Judges have resorted to fictions to justify
the rule. They have said that master and servant are one in the eyes
of the law, or that qui facit per alia facit per se, usually without saying
why. Although the master's ability to control the servant is dubious in
modern business, he has been held liable because he has the theoretical
right of control. However, modem writers have generally stressed three
grounds for maintaining the doctrine.7 First, if the master is liable for
his servants' negligence he will presumably be encouraged to stress safety
in the operation of his business. Second, injuries due to negligence are
one of the costs of the master's enterprise. Since he is entitled to the
profits, he ought to pay all the costs. Third, the damages which the
statute. Compare Norris v. Pacific Indem. Co., 39 Cal. 2d 420, 247 P.2d 1 (1952), with
Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal. 2d 454, 139 P.2d 645, (1943). The result in the insurance case is
justifiable only if the plaintiff can still recover on the owner's policy by suing the
owner under the owner consent statute. In other states, the proper interpretation of
these omnibus clauses should depend on whether there is a public policy in favor of
allowing injured plaintiffs to recover on the policy, or whether the court sees its job
as merely one of interpreting a contract. Some of the difficulties are indicated by
Hodge v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 203 Va. 275, 123 S.E.2d 372 (1962); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Stilson, 34 F. Supp. 885 (D. Minn. 1940); Potts v. Farmers' Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 233 Wis. 313, 289 N.W. 606 (1940).
4 See Collie v. Aust, 173 Cal. App. 2d 793, 342 P.2d 998 (1959). The right of subrogation is specifically provided for by the California statute, but it would seem to
exist under tort or agency principles in any case. Kramer v. Morgan, 85 F.2d 96 (2d
Cir. 1936).
5 HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 68 (1920).
6 BATY, VIcAIouS LiABiIrry 29 (1916).
7 These theories have been the subject of innumerable writings. See, e.g., Seavey,
Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior", in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (1934); Smith,
Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUm. L. Rxv. 444 (1923).
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master must pay will be reflected in his price for the product or service.
The market will then determine whether the benefits of the product or
service justify all its costs, including injuries. If the consuming public
refuses to buy at a price which will compensate the injuries arising out
of the business, then the enterprise which creates the risk of injury will
cease.
Superficially the policies behind respondeat superior and the owner
consent statutes are parallel. The risk of a business enterprise can be
compared to the risk of maintaining an automobile. The statutes should
encourage owners to allow only careful drivers to use their vehicles. The
effect of the statutes will be to add permittee-caused losses to the cost of
automobile ownership through increased insurance premiums. Viewed
in this fashion, the statutes appear to be an extension of respondeat
superior to automobile owners, and so the relationship has been described by courts and leading authorities.8 In fact, however, there are
as many differences as similarities, and an ill-considered application by
the courts of concepts borrowed from the law of agency has often frustrated the purposes of the statutes.
The requirement of consent has been the major source of confusion.
It is understandable that the legislatures did not want to make an owner
liable for the negligence of someone who stole his car. 9 But the requirement of consent has come to mean much more. In the much cited case
of Chaika v. Vandenberg,10 the defendant owner was the father of the
driver, who negligently struck the plaintiff in New York City. The
defendant testified that he had given his son permission to drive on
Long Island, but had specifically forbidden him to drive into the city.
The trial judge, directing a verdict for the plaintiff, had found this
testimony immaterial, observing: "Where the owner intrusts the car...
8 "In effect an agency relation is created, which results in vicarious liability."
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 371 (2d ed. 1955). Sometimes the statute
itself may suggest that the relationship is one of agency. "[T]he operator thereof shall
in case of accident, be deemed to be the agent of the owner ...." D.C. CoDE tit. 40,
§ 424 (1961). This is not to say, however, that the relationship is in all respects identical
to that of master and servant.
9 Lack of a consent requirement caused the Michigan Supreme Court to declare
that state's early owner liability statute unconstitutional. Daugherty v. Thomas, 174
Mich. 371, 140 N.W. 615 (1913). The statute provided that the owner was to be liable
for the negligence of any driver who had not actually stolen the car. The case involved
a garage repairman who drove the car a short distance to test it without the owner's
express permission. The court found the statute in violation of "natural justice" and
due process of law because the owner was made liable when he was in no way at fault. A
revised statute which required the owner's consent was upheld, however, in Stapleton v.
Independent Brewing Co., 198 Mich. 170, 164 N.W. 520 (1917). The fact that the new
statute also provided for liability without fault did not bother the court, since it was
felt that the requirement of consent satisfied the dictates of natural justice.
10 252 N.Y. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929).
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to be used in the business or for the pleasure of the driver, I do not
think that violation of restrictions put upon the route to be taken should
relieve the owner from liability under the statute."". The Appellate
Division affirmed, but the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, ruling
that the defendant's testimony, if true, should bar recovery. A slight
deviation from the terms of the permission might be unimportant, but
a deliberate violation of the fundamental terms of a restricted permission relieved the owner of liability.
The reasoning of Chaika v. Vandenberg was followed by nearly all
the later cases in the jurisdictions having owner consent statutes. 12 It
soon developed into a doctrine of scope of permission, similar to the
scope of employment limitation of respondeat superior. It was dear that
an owner could not avoid liability for his permittee's negligence by
instructing him to drive carefully, any more than a master could claim
that his negligent servant was outside the scope of his employment because he had been directed to use due care.13 But the cautious owner
who limited the time and the place in which the permittee could use
his car stood on a better footing, because the permittee who exceeded
such limitations was like the servant off on a frolic. 1 4 One court went

so far as to say that in a master and servant situation, scope of consent
means scope of employment. 15 Other courts felt that an employee might
be within the scope of consent when outside the scope of employment,
or within the scope of employment when outside the scope of consent. 16
At any rate, the effect of the permittee's exceeding permission was the
same as that of the servant's exceeding the scope of his employment:
It relieved the owner of liability.
Although the parallel was neat, a close look at the underlying policies
would have revealed fundamental differences between the enterprise liability of respondeat superior and the instrumentality liability of the
owner consent statutes. It is important to realize that respondeatsuperior
was not developed specifically to deal with masters who entrust their
servants with potentially dangerous machines. This is well illustrated by
11 Id. at 104, 169 N.E. at 103-04.
12 Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Cal. 2d 526, 75 P.2d 1051 (1938); Kieszkowski v. Odlewany,
280 Mich. 388, 273 N.W. 741 (1937); Truman v. United Prods. Corp., 217 Minn. 155,
14 N.W.2d 120 (1944). But see Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.
1934), interpreting Ontario law. The law of California today seems unsettled. Compare
Garmon v. Sebastian, 181 Cal. App. 2d 454, 5 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1960), with Peterson v.
Greiger, Inc., 57 Cal. 2d 43, 367 P.2d 420, 17 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1962).
13 Henrietta v. Evans, supra note 12.
14

Ibid.

15 Kieszkowski v. Odlewany, 280 Mich. 388, 273 N.W. 741 (1937).
16 Hughes v. Quackenbush, 1 Cal. App. 2d 349, 37 P.2d 99 (1934); Moore v. Palmer,
350 Mich. 363, 86 N.W.2d 585 (1957).
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Annis v. Postal Tel. Co., 17 where the plaintiff was injured in a sidewalk
collision with a running telegraph delivery boy. The court held that
the telegraph company was liable because the boy was a servant acting
within the scope of his employment, even though he had not been provided with a vehicle. The modem policy justification for the result
would be that it will encourage the company to select and train more
careful delivery boys, that the plaintiff's injury is one of the costs of
the company's enterprise, and that the loss can be spread among the
company's customers through the price mechanism. Clearly, this enterprise liability theory would not justify holding the company liable if
the boy were on a personal errand, or playing baseball in a busy street
on his day off. Risks created by such conduct are not a part of the
company's enterprise, and there is no more reason to shift the resulting
losses to the telegraph company or its customers than to shift them to
any other segment of the public. But the liability of the owner of an
automobile for the driver's negligence is not based on the driver's being
about the owner's business, if so there would be no need for owner consent statutes. The true basis is that the owner has entrusted the driver
with a vehicle, and thus given him the power to cause injuries by driving
negligently. Even though the driver has been ordered not to go to New
York, or to return the car by noon, he has been given the means to cause
an injury in Times Square at dusk. The considerations which justify
holding the master liable in the A nnis case also justify holding the owner
of an automobile liable even when the permittee exceeds the "scope of
consent"--the Chaika v. Vandenberg situation. First, it is in the public
interest to discourage owners from lending their vehicles to careless
drivers, whether those drivers obey the terms of their permission or not.
Second, one of the risks of permitting another to use an automobile is
that he may use it negligently, either inside or outside the scope of permission. If an owner is going to lend his vehicle to others, he should
be prepared to accept liability for the harm he thus enables them to
cause. Third, the owner can and should protect himself by buying insurance. By this means the harm caused by automobiles is borne, in the
form of insurance premiums, by their owners, the class which benefits
from their use. Suppose that the young driver in Chaika v. Vandenberg
had struck three pedestrians: one on Long Island just after leaving his
home, the second in New York City, and the third on Long Island again
while returning home. Under the rule of the case, there would certainly
be liability for the first, there would certaintly not be liability for the
second, and there is no way of telling whether there would be liability
for the third. Thus a misapplication of the technicalities of respondeat
superior results in decisions which nullify the policy of the statute.
17 114 Ind. App. 543, 52 N.E.2d 373 (1944).
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There is another practical argument for following the rule of the
trial court rather than the Court of Appeals in Chaika v. Vandenberg.
The only testimony offered as to the restriction on permission was the
owner's, and it was evidently interested. On retrial it might be corroborated by the son, or other members of the family, but impartial
testimony might well be impossible to obtain. There is a real opportunity
to exaggerate the definiteness of the restriction on use, if not to commit
outright perjury.18 If the plaintiff is required to prove that the driver
was within the scope of his permission, he may find it impossible to
gather the necessary testimony. In Rosenberg v. Murray,19 the defendant
owner received a directed verdict on his own testimony that the driver,
his employee, took the vehicle without permission. If the jury is permitted to weigh the testimony's credibility, its decision is apt to be
guesswork. The plaintiffs right to recover from the owner may be worth
very little if the owner's interested testimony as to the way he remembers
the terms of consent is taken seriously.
In view of the easy acceptance of limitations on time and place, it is
surprising that the courts had little trouble in finding the owner liable
when his permittee entrusted the car to a third person without authorization. This problem was thoroughly and thoughtfully considered by
Judge Cardozo in the landmark case of Grant v. Knepper,20 under both
respondeatsuperior and the New York owner consent statute. The owner
had sent out his truck with a driver and a salesman who was not a
licensed or competent driver. The salesman prevailed upon the driver
to let him take the wheel for a while, and eventually collided with a
parked car. Cardozo found the owner liable under two theories. He was
liable under respondeat superior because the driver, his employee, was
negligent within the scope of his employment in letting an incompetent
substitute drive and in not supervising him properly. He was liable
under the owner consent statute because the driver was using the car
even when he was not at the wheel. It does not appear from the opinion
that this latter holding would be any different if the salesman had been
a licensed driver whose negligence was unforeseeable. In effect, Cardozo
was simply saying that such a violation of the terms of permission was
not enough to save the owner. The California Supreme Court extended
this rule in Souza v. Corti,21 where the owner loaned his car to his son,
18 See the dissent of Langdon, J., in Henrietta v. Evans, 10 Cal. 2d 526, 75 P.2d 1051
(1938).
19 116 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
20 245 N.Y. 158, 156 N.E. 650 (1927).
21 22 Cal. 2d 454, 139 P.2d 645 (1943). See also Burgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal. 2d 320, 158
P.2d 393 (1945). For an appreciation of some of the problems this result raises, see
Norris v. Pacific Indem. Co., 39 Cal. 2d 420, 247 P.2d 1 (1952); Collie v. Aust, 173 Cal.
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with instructions not to let anyone else drive it. The son let a friend
drive anyway, and an accident followed. There was no evidence that
the friend was incompetent or unlicensed, and the son was not in the
car at the time of the accident. Nevertheless, the court found that the
car was being used with the owner's permission at the time of the accident because the use was within the time, place and purpose of the
permission. The son had merely violated a "secret restriction ... on the
manner of use .... Violations of such restrictions may not be said to

cause a revocation of the permission." 22 Surprisingly, the court reached
this conclusion without overruling Henrietta v. Evans, 23 which had
adopted the rule of Chaika v. Vandenberg. That case, it said, involved
a restriction as to time, place or purpose of use. A restriction as to manner of use was quite a different thing. Telling the driver he may not
let anyone else drive is like telling him not to exceed the speed limit.
Telling him not to drive to New York is like telling him he may not
drive at all.
Souza v. Corti stretches the agency-derived theory of scope of consent,
but it by no means abandons it. If the father had been an employer and
the son an employee, liability could have been founded on respondeat
superior as well as on the statute so long as the vehicle was at least arguably on the employer's business. If the court can say that letting a
third person drive without authorization is not the kind of deviation
that will relieve the owner of liability, it can as easily say that it is not
a sufficient deviation from the terms of the employment to relieve the
master of liability.2 4 In the Chaika v. Vandenberg situation, if the son
had been an employee supposedly about his father's business on Long
Island, his driving to New York could not have been said to be in
furtherance of his father's business. It would have been a textbook
example of frolic and detour, solidly governed by countless precedents.
Liability could not have been founded on respondeat superior. This
technical reasoning may explain why the courts came to results which
were so inconsistent from the point of view of policy. On any analysis
of the policy of the statutes, the results ought to be the same in both
kinds of cases. If the policy is to protect plaintiffs who are injured by
financially irresponsible drivers, then clearly there should be liability
in both. On the other hand, if the policy is to allow owners to protect
themselves by reasonable limitations on permission, then a limitation
on who is to drive the car is every bit as reasonable as a limitation on
App. 2d 793, 342 P.2d 998 (1959); Rose v. Porter, 101 Cal. App. 2d 333, 225 P.2d 245
(1950).
22 22 Cal. 2d at 460-61, 139 P.2d at 648.
23 See cases cited note 12 supra.
24 That was what the court did in Farrell v. Pinson Transfer Co., 293 S.W.2d 170

(Ct. App. Ky. 1956).
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where it is to be driven. Both situations raise the problem of proof:
The owner's testimony on the alleged restrictions is likely to be unreliable. The best solution would seem to be that of Carter, J., concurring
in Burgess v. Cahill:
If the legislature had intended that the owner should have the
right to limit his liability by restricting the operation of such
automobile to a specific time or place, it could have so stated,
but it did not do so for obvious reasons. The protection which
the statute was designed to afford would be clearly reduced by
permitting the owner to so limit his liability. The owner can
protect himself by insurance against any risk he may assume by
permitting the operation of his automobile by third persons,
while a victim of the negligent operation of such automobile
suffers the same loss whether the automobile is being operated
25
with or without the permission of the owner.
There may also be problems about how the consent was obtained. The
driver in Roehrich v. Holt Motor Co.26 was an imaginative youth who
obtained a car from a dealer by representing himself to be a prospective
buyer who wanted to show it to his father before making up his mind.
His only intention, in fact, was to have a joy ride. The court found that
the youth was not driving with the consent of the owner, because consent
obtained by fraud is not consent. It is more like theft. Such reasoning
completely misses the point. The owner ought to be liable because he
has placed an automobile in the hands of a financially irresponsible
person who may drive it negligently, whether he intends to buy it or not.
An automobile dealer ought to obtain insurance for the protection of
the public if he is going to allow people who represent themselves to be
prospective buyers to drive his cars. A California court reached this
result when the negligent driver had rented the automobile under a
false name. The court held that the name of the driver was immaterial:
The fact was that he was entrusted with an automobile.27 An even more
interesting argument is to be found in Lind v. Eddy.28 There the owner
was nineteen years old, and claimed that as a minor he was incapable of
giving consent, or at least could repudiate it upon reaching twenty-one,
thus causing it to vanish as if it had never been. The court sensibly
refused to extend its protection of minors to such a case, but said in a
dictum that an owner who was really incapable of consent, such as an
idiot, would not be liable. It is to be hoped that the courts will not read
25 26 Cal. 2d 320, 326, 158 P.2d 393, 396 (1945).
26 201 Minn. 586, 277 N.W. 274 (1938).
27 Tuderios v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 70 Cal. App. 2d 192, 160 P.2d 554

(1945).
28

232 Iowa 1328, 6 N.W.2d 427 (1942). Compare Ridley v. Young, 64 Cal. App. 2d

503, 149 P.2d 76 (1944).
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all the details of the law of contracts into the word "consent." It is hard
to believe that the idiot problem is a real one, for one may assume that
idiots rarely own automobiles. If one were a titular owner, it might be
found that his guardian was the owner for the purpose of the statute.
In any case, a minor who is capable of owning and maintaining an
automobile ought to be capable of assuming responsibility for its use on
2
the same basis as an adult.

9

The difficulties discussed so far have arisen, it is submitted, because the
courts and the writers have thought of the owner-permittee relationship
as an agency relationship, when it is in fact different in important
respects. Other aberrations, however, are not so easily explained or
excused. For example, the courts had an astonishing difficulty with the
word "negligence," as it appeared in the statutes. Many states have
automobile guest statutes, which provide that a non-paying passenger
who is injured cannot recover from the driver or owner of the vehicle in
which he was riding except for "willful misconduct," or some similar
form of gross misbehavior. In Payton v. Delnay,s0 a case arising under
such a statute, the attorney for the owner argued that his client was not
guilty of willful misconduct simply for lending his car to another. The
court saw that that was not the point: Under such reasoning, the owner
would never be liable unless he were personally negligent. The point
was that the policy of the legislation would be served by interpreting
"negligence" to include willful misconduct. It should be stressed that
the "willful misconduct" was simply extremely gross negligence; the
driver did not intend to injure the plaintiff. It would be a strange policy
which said that the owner ought to be liable when his permittee was
careless, but not when he was terribly careless. Regrettably, the California
Supreme Court had said just that in Weber v. Pinyan3 1 An owner was
held liable for the driver's negligence, but not for injuries resulting
from his "willful misconduct or intoxication," the phrase used in the
California guest statute. This result suggests the possibility of an owner
escaping liability by proving that his permittee was drunk at the time
of the accidentl Such results understandably undermine public confidence
in the good sense of the judiciary. There is no need to frustrate the policy
of the legislature with such a hair-splitting misinterpretation of the
legislative intent.
29 Still another problem arises when A lends his car to B who is hit by C. In A's
suit against C for damages to the car, should B's contributory negligence be imputed
to A? A leading case said it should not because the policy of the statute does not apply
to contributory negligence. Mills v. Gabriel, 284 N.Y. 751, 31 N.E.2d 512 (1940).
Compare Stuart v. Pilgrim, 247 Iowa 709, 74 N.W.2d 212 (1956), reaching the opposite
result.
3o 348 Mich. 238, 83 N.W.2d 204 (1957).
31 9 Cal. 2d 226, 70 P.2d 183 (1937).
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The point about willful misconduct can be carried a step further, to
the case of a driver who deliberately runs down a victim in order to kill
him. Under agency theory, there should be no liability unless the killing
82
was done to accomplish a result within the scope of employment.
Although research has disclosed no cases under the owner consent statutes
in which willful killing has actually occurred, presumably the courts
would say that the statute makes the owner liable only for the driver's
negligence, and although that term may include willful and wanton
misconduct, it does not include deliberate attempts at murder. This
would no doubt be entirely correct as a piece of statutory interpretation,
but there is nothing to the logic of owner liability which ought to prevent
the legislature from extending liability to the owner in the willful
murder situation. Public policy is surely in favor of discouraging owners
from lending their vehicles to murderers or maniacs, and the owner who
does lend to a murderer or maniac has given him a power to cause injury
that he would otherwise not have. The victim or his family certainly
deserves the protection of the owner's insurance policy just as much as
the victim of the merely negligent driver.
The principal objection to extending the liability of the owner under
the statutes to its logical limits is that such an extension will have harsh
effects on owners who are themselves not at fault and are inadequately
insured. Such a fear led the Michigan Supreme Court to.hold that state's
early owner's liability statute unconstitutional.83 The fact is that the
owner consent statutes, like respondeat superior, are designed to fasten
liability where there is no fault, as a means of shifting the burden of
injuries onto those best able to bear it. The way for an owner to protect
himself is either by purchasing insurance or by refusing to let others use
his vehicle, not by leaving the loss on the innocent victim.
Perhaps the reason the courts have had such difficulty in discarding
outworn concepts is that the legislatures have chosen to make modifications within the traditional system of automobile tort liability rather
than to make fundamental changes. The arguments used to justify the
owner consent statutes could also be used to justify statutes making
owners liable for all harm caused by their vehicles whether driven by the
owner, his permittee or a thief, and whether the driver was negligent or
not. The owner consent statutes form a small island of a new kind of
liability in a sea of negligence and agency law. It is understandable that
the courts have resorted to traditional concepts in interpreting them, for
the legislature has not made a clear choice between the old and the new.
But legislative schizophrenia should not blind the courts to the important
differences between enterprise and instrumentality liability.
§ 245 (1933).
88 Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 140 N.W. 615 (1913).
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